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Abstract 
In response to policy developments aiming to increase the involvement of penal voluntary 
organisations in criminal justice, a recent flurry of commentary has provided a marketised 
understanding of the penal voluntary sector and attempts to privatise it. Although this commentary 
has contributed significantly to the limited literature on the sector, the centrality of neoliberal policy 
in analysis is problematic. This article provides a critique of relevant commentary and offers a new 
exploration of the penal voluntary sector that extends beyond neoliberalism and marketisation. A 
preliminary exploration of an alternative model is made, using political economy to provide a 
nuanced and politically enabling understanding of the role of voluntary organisations in criminal 
justice. 
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Recent policy developments suggest a further increasing role for penal voluntary organisations 
(PVOs) through marketisation in the criminal justice system (CJS). Notable developments include 
the broad Big Society initiative, the public service reforms suggested in the Modernising 
Commissioning Green Paper (Cabinet Office, 2010) and the criminal justice specific Transforming 
Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform; Breaking the Cycle Green Paper and Corston report (MoJ, 
2013; MoJ, 2010; Home Office, 2007). In response, a flurry of academic commentary has discussed 
the government's “dramatically increased engagement” with the penal voluntary sector (PVS) as a 
potential provider of criminal justice services under contract (Neilson, 2009: 408; see also Maguire, 
2012; Morgan, 2012; Corcoran, 2011; Gojkovic et al., 2011; Mills et al., 2011; Meek et al., 2010; 
Benson and Hedge, 2009; Corcoran, 2009; Silvestri, 2009). The impact of neoliberal policy reforms 
has been a key theme in academic commentary and commentators have discussed the PVS in terms 
of its links to the “wider agenda of 'post-welfare' state modernization” (Corcoran, 2011: 34) and the 
“marketisation of criminal justice” (Maguire, 2012: 484; Morgan 2012). The aim of this article is 
not to critique neoliberal policies and the the marketisation of criminal justice per se. Rather, it 
critiques the centrality of the market in recent commentary and makes a preliminary indication of an 
alternative analytical direction which is more theoretically complete and politically enabling.   
 
 This recent body of commentary has stimulated discussion about the PVS and made an 
important contribution to the limited body of knowledge in this area. Scholars have acknowledged 
that research examining the role of the PVS in criminal justice is “lacking” (Mills et al., 2011: 195) 
and that the PVS remains “a descriptive rather than theoretically rigorous concept or empirically 
defined entity” (Corcoran, 2011: 33). Nevertheless, commentators have made strong arguments 
about the impact and importance of neoliberal reforms on the PVS. Market reforms have apparently 
raised “troubling issues for the voluntary sector” (Neilson, 2009: 401), impacting upon “the sector's 
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independence and ethos” (Mills et al., 2011: 193). Such reforms are threatening the “distinctiveness 
and critical voice” of the PVS (Mills et al., 2011: 193) and causing “contemporary dilemmas of 
institutionalization” (Corcoran, 2011: 33). 
 
 Although timely and important, these arguments are problematic because the centrality of 
marketisation in this literature results in a partial analysis that tends towards economic determinism 
and neglects the agency and heterogeneity of the PVS. This article is by no means intended to imply 
that the PVS is beyond the effects neoliberal policies or immune to marketisation and 
institutionalisation. Neoliberal penal reform undeniably impacts upon the PVS and forms an 
important area of inquiry. Furthermore, PVOs clearly take proposed market reforms seriously. 
Following the publication of Breaking the Cycle, Clinks (the umbrella organisation for penal 
voluntary organisations) consulted with their members and produced a formal response to the paper 
(Clinks, 2011). At least 28 PVOs also produced individual responses to the paper (e.g. Howard 
League, 2011).   
 
 However, a broader approach to studying the PVS is required. Neoliberal penal reforms are 
undeniably occurring, but it is imperative that scholars acknowledge the considerable political 
impact of how these processes are theorised (Hart, 2002: 813; Zedner, 2002). Neoliberal penal 
reforms are neither monolithic nor cohesive forces and to portray them as such is reductionist and 
politically disabling (Hart, 2002: 813). It is therefore necessary to theorise the relationship between 
the PVS and the CJS in a way that does not neglect economic variables, but considers them in a 
wider context. This article provides an introduction to the PVS and contextualises neoliberal penal 
reform, before offering a new exploration of the penal voluntary sector informed by political 
economy. This new exploration extends beyond neoliberalism and examines the agency, innovation 
and heterogeneity found amongst PVOs. 
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Neoliberalism and a Brief Political Context 
 
Neoliberalism is a complex and often ill-defined term (Mudge, 2008). The key tenet of 
neoliberalism is that privatising previously public services stimulates cost-efficiency and therefore 
saves public money (Corcoran, 2009: 33). Neoliberalism is comprised of three interconnected 
'faces' (Mudge, 2008). Its intellectual face places an “unadulterated emphasis” on the market as the 
source and arbiter of human freedoms; its political face evinces a new 'market-centric politics'; and 
its bureaucratic face can be seen in privatisation policies which aim to 'desacralise' institutions such 
as criminal justice and health care, which had previously been protected from private market 
competition (Mudge, 2008: 703-4; Corcoran, 2009: 33). Although all three faces are evident in and 
relevant to this discussion, it is the bureaucratic face that is most significant here.  
 
 The process of reconfiguring the delivery of criminal justice services began in the 1980s and 
continued under a series of successive governments. The Conservative Thatcher government 
introduced neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s, which saw previously public services (e.g. 
criminal justice, health) become privatised through the creation of competitive service delivery 
markets (Ryan, 2011). In theory, these markets would drive down the cost of the expensive Welfare 
State (Ryan, 2011: 517; Corcoran, 2009: 33; Garland, 1996: 453). This government enacted the 
Criminal Justice Act in 1991, part of which enabled prisons to be transferred to private management 
and required Probation boards to commission drug programmes for offenders from voluntary and 
private providers (Corcoran, 2011: 36-7). This unsettled the state monopoly on the allocation and 
delivery of punishment which had been established around 1877 (Ryan, 2011: 517; Maguire, 2012: 
484). It is important to note that this monopoly was unsettled due to neoliberal economic concerns 
that developed outside the penal apparatus (Ryan, 2011: 516). 
5/31 
 
 The Conservative-inspired changes were then “substantially endorsed by New Labour” 
(Ryan, 2011: 518) who continued the process of externalisation to create a 'mixed economy' of 
public services (Corcoran, 2011: 37). The Offender Management Act of 2007 emphasised the role of 
market discipline in regulating performance and further enabled some of the responsibilities 
traditionally associated with probation to be taken on by private and voluntary organisations (Meek 
et al., 2010: 4; Corcoran, 2011: 37). Furthermore, in response to the Corston report in 2007, £12 
million of Ministry of Justice (MoJ) funding was allocated to voluntary organisations for the 
provision of community-based support to women offenders and women at risk of offending, to 
divert them from custody (NEF, 2012: 7; Mills et al., 2011: 104). This short term funding was then 
replaced by the Women's Diversionary Fund, which was established in 2010 to sustain and develop 
the women's community services sector following heavy MoJ budget cuts. The MoJ contributed £1 
million to the fund and the Corston Independent Funders' Coalition of 20 independent philanthropic 
foundations matched this sum (NEF, 2012). 
 
 With the publication of the Breaking the Cycle Green Paper (MoJ, 2010), it seems the 
ConDem coalition government are “set to continue along Thatcher's radical path and roll back the 
state still further” (Ryan, 2011: 518). This Green Paper emphasised the failures of the “top-down 
approach” and stated the government's “clear commitment to decentralisation” (MoJ, 2010: 6,8). By 
emphasising the role for voluntary, charitable and profit-making groups in running penal services, 
this strategy combines the ideological imperative for a smaller regulatory State with the material 
imperative for fiscal austerity at this time of a record UK public deficit (Ryan, 2011: 518).  
 
  Commentators argue that the voluntary sector has been harnessed to this “wider agenda of 
'post-welfare' state modernization” (Corcoran, 2011: 34, Maguire, 2012: 484). The voluntary sector 
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has had a clear political appeal, being in line with the Conservative ideology of privatisation and 
then the New Labour rhetoric of community (Ryan, 2011: 517; Corcoran, 2011: 36). In addition to 
these ideological links, the voluntary sector has had a pragmatic appeal, as it can sometimes operate 
criminal justice interventions very cheaply. The series of neoliberal modernization projects 
described above have ostensibly been “shaping voluntary sector agents to the demands of the penal 
marketplace” (Corcoran, 2011: 45, emphasis added).  
 
The Penal Voluntary Sector 
 
In their simplest form, voluntary sector organisations are located between the market and the state 
(Kendall and Deakin, 2010: 221). Corcoran (2011: 33) provides a useful working definition of penal 
voluntary organisations as “charitable and self-defined voluntary agencies working with prisoners 
and offenders in prison- and community-based programmes”. The limits of the penal voluntary 
sector are blurry, and at present the term encompasses both organisations who are solely focussed on 
offenders and/or their families (e.g. FPWP Hibiscus, Nacro, Prisoners' Advice Service, The Howard 
League for Penal Reform) and organisations for whom offenders and/or their families are one of 
their multiple client groups e.g. The Fawcett Society (campaign for women’s equality); Phoenix 
Futures, RAPt (provide drug and alcohol services); Hampton Trust (support the vulnerable and 
socially excluded); Ormiston Children’s Charity, Barnardo’s, Catch 22 (support young people). 
 
 Voluntary organisations have a range of functions and most voluntary organisations are 
multi-functional (Kendall and Knapp, 1995: 67). Many PVOs perform a service delivery function,  
whereby voluntary agencies supply a direct service to clients, either in kind or in the form of 
information and support (Kendall and Knapp, 1995: 67). For example, Fine Cell Work trains 
prisoners in paid, skilled, creative needlework (FCW, 2010: 2). Where PVOs are involved in 
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'privatised' or contracted-out work, this usually entails service delivery. But the activities of the PVS 
extend beyond service delivery.  
 
 Numerous PVOs also have a campaigning function, where they collect information about a 
specific interest and use this information to put pressure on decision makers in a public arena 
through direct action, campaigning, lobbying and advocacy to change policy and practices (Kendall 
and Knapp, 1995: 67). The work of The Prison Reform Trust (PRT) illustrates this function:  the 
PRT aims to create a “just, humane and effective penal system” by “influencing Parliament, 
Government and officials towards reform” (PRT, 2010: 4).  
 
 Some voluntary organisations have a mutual aid function, where the focus is on self-help 
and exchange around a common need (Kendall and Knapp, 1995: 67). For example, The Apex Trust 
run the ACT 4 Women Project in Merseyside, a women-only peer support project providing 
opportunities for project beneficiaries to also support their peers in building self-confidence and 
self-reliance (Apex, 2010: 4). There is also a co-ordinating function, which involves umbrella 
organisations providing services to other voluntary sector bodies (Kendall and Knapp, 1995: 67). 
CLINKS is one such organisation, supporting voluntary and community organisations who work 
with or for offenders and their families (CLINKS, 2010: 2). 
 
The Market in Criminal Justice and the PVS 
 
As a result of neoliberal reforms over the last three decades, there is now a mixed economy of 
service provision in criminal justice, with private and voluntary providers operating alongside the 
public sector (Ryan, 2011: 517; Corcoran, 2009: 33; Garland, 2001: 98). Numerous areas of the 
penal system are privatised at present, across a spectrum of activities that runs from individual 
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regime elements e.g. prison catering services being outsourced to private companies, to the 
wholesale transfer of responsibility to private contractors for the provision and daily running of 
penal institutions (Zedner, 2004: 276). HMP Wolds was the first private prison in the UK, which 
opened in 1992 and there are now 11 prisons managed under contract by private companies such as 
Serco and G4S Justice Services. The first private probation contract was won by Serco in 2012, 
involving the supervision of probationers on community payback sentences in London (Travis, 
2012). Although there was no PVS involvement in that contract, Serco formed a 'pioneering' 
probation alliance with two PVOs shortly after, in order to bid for probation service delivery 
contracts (Serco, 2012).  
 
 PVOs are directly involved in 'privatised' or contracted out service delivery in a number of 
ways. No charity has taken sole responsibility for the provision or daily running of a penal 
institution. But, the charities Turning Point and Catch 22 are “leading voluntary sector partners” to 
the private provider Serco. This consortium holds a £415 million contract to construct the new 
prison at Belmarsh West and operate it for 26.5 years, with the two charities providing rehabilitation 
and resettlement services (Serco, 2010). Whether charities in such consortia are in fact equal 
partners or junior partners who are essentially 'bid candy' is under debate (Maguire, 2012: 485). 
PVOs are also involved in low-level privatisation, i.e. the contracting out of individual regime 
elements (Zedner, 2004: 276). The Prison Advice and Care Trust hold contracts to run visitor 
centres at 15 prisons (PACT, 2011: 18). On a smaller scale, Contact Cheshire Support Group holds a 
three year contract to run the visitor and first night centre at HMP Styal (CCSG Annual Report, 
2010; CCSG, 2011: 10).  
 
 In a similar vein, payment by results (PbR) pilot schemes are currently being run in the CJS. 
In order to encourage greater efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery, the contractor's 
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payment is linked to results achieved (Puddicombe et al, 2012; Maguire, 2012; Fox and Albertson, 
2011). If results fall below an agreed performance threshold, the contractor may receive reduced or 
no payment. A notable pilot is based at HMP Peterborough, which is privately run by Sodexo. The 
pilot programme has been co-ordinated by Social Finance, who raised funding of £5 million to 
operate the programme working with both short-sentence prisoners inside prison and after release, 
with the aim of reducing reconviction rates. Charities involved in the pilot include St Giles Trust, 
Ormiston Children and Families Trust and YMCA (Social Finance, 2011).  
 
An Overview of Recent Commentary 
 
 The Breaking the Cycle Green Paper emphasises that decentralising criminal justice services 
“provides a once in a generation opportunity” for providers from all sectors to work alongside staff 
in the criminal justice system in order to make a “real difference” (MoJ, 2010: 9). Despite this 
positive policy rhetoric, commentators have detailed how participating in the market for criminal 
justice services brings risks for PVOs. It is easy to see the clash between the voluntary sector's 
distinctive ethics of compassion and focus on the needs of individual offenders (Silvestri, 2009: 3,4; 
Corcoran, 2008: 37) and Government policy, which has often implied “greater use of imprisonment, 
for longer periods, and more intensive supervision in the community” (Faulkner, 2007: 144; see 
also Maguire, 2012: 486). As a result of neoliberal penal reforms, PVOs are argued to be under 
threat of becoming servants of government and, ultimately, agents of penal expansionism (Meek et 
al., 2010: 7; Silvestri, 2009: 4). 
 
 The market in criminal justice services puts voluntary organisations at risk of 'goal 
distortion', i.e. moving away from their original mission in the pursuit of contract funding and 
compromising their campaigning and advocacy roles, in favour of delivering services for statutory 
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organisations (Mills et al., 2011: 207; Neilson, 2009: 407; Kendall, 2003: 78). The potential risks to 
the campaigning roles of voluntary organisations posed by the growth of penal service markets have 
been well-documented, with concerns thus far centring around the 2008 Nacro bid to run a prison. 
This has an understandably prominent place in the literature, being contentious because of Nacro's 
“strength as a campaigning organisation”, with a “firmly established policy line on the expanding 
secure estate” (Neilson, 2009: 406, 404; Corcoran, 2011: 31; Mills et al., 2011: 195). Although the 
Nacro bid was ultimately unsuccessful, it threatened to undermine the organisation's campaigning 
and advocacy roles (Neilson, 2009: 406).   
 
 As a result of the market in criminal justice services, it is feared that increasing numbers of 
voluntary organisations will compromise their independence and become quasi-governmental:  
engaged with and dependent on the government (Neilson, 2009: 408). Operating in this market 
therefore poses risks to the “potential loss of the sector's distinctiveness and critical voice” (Mills et 
al., 2011: 193). Similar dilemmas apply across the voluntary sector (Carmel and Harlock, 2008; 
Paxton and Pearce, 2005; Ilcan and Basok, 2004; Kendall, 2003; Evans and Shields, 2002). 
However, these dangers could be particularly pertinent for the penal voluntary sector, as the 
“unpopular nature of work with offenders” means that voluntary organisations working in the 
criminal justice arena “are more likely to be dependent on contracts” (Mills et al., 2011: 207; 
Gojkovic et al., 2011: 18).  
 
The Centrality of Markets in Recent Commentary 
 
Funding is at the heart of the argument for a marketised understanding of the PVS. Commentators 
suggest that because many penal voluntary organisations are heavily reliant on statutory funding 
(Gojkovic et al., 2011: 18; Corcoran, 2011: 32; Mills et al., 2011: 193; Ryan, 2011: 519; Neilson, 
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2009: 401; Silvestri, 2009: 3), the voluntary sector is highly vulnerable to “being drawn into [...] 
marketised penal reform” (Corcoran, 2011: 46) because it is feared that voluntary organisations 
could therefore be compelled to respond to policy developments geared to increase their role in 
criminal justice provision (Mills et al., 2011: 194). If they do not, their survival could be threatened, 
because “funding will follow those organisations willing to adapt their priorities to fit those of the 
criminal justice system” (Mills et al., 2011: 195).  
 
 Voluntary organisations are apparently unable to resist neoliberal reforms, because they “do 
not have the [...] option” to avoid participating in the market for penal services (Garside, 2004: 9; 
Mills et al., 2011: 207). If voluntary organisations like Nacro or SOVA fail to win contracts to 
provide services to the CJS, the implications are “serious”, because, unlike private sector 
organisations, they do not have the option to sustain their existence through alternative operations 
(Garside, 2004: 9). The growth of competitive service commissioning has occurred alongside 
reductions in government grant funding, which further increases the imperative to participate 
(Maguire, 2012: 485; Meek, et al., 2010, p.8). Following this line of argument, PVOs are either 
“rolling over” in the face of pressures to compete for service delivery contracts “or going under” 
and failing to survive (Benson and Hedge, 2009: 35). Just as “the official conception of the 
voluntary sector is that of biddable service deliverers” (Corcoran, 2009: 32), the criminological 
literature tends to selectively focus on the role of voluntary organisations as competitors in the 
market for penal services. Following this literature, becoming proactively competitive appears to be 
a financial necessity for penal voluntary organisations (Corcoran, 2011: 43).  
 
 There are a group of PVOs who are “highly dependent” upon statutory sources of funding 
(Corcoran, 2011: 41). Examples include Langley House Trust, Nacro and St Giles Trust (Langley 
House Trust 2011: 8; Neilson, 2009: 403; St Giles Trust, 2010: 3). There is a particular dependence 
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on statutory sources of funding amongst the largest PVOs, which could be argued to have the 
greatest impact amongst the sector. However, the aforementioned concept of funding following 
organisations that adapt their priorities to fit those of the criminal justice system (Mills et al., 2011: 
195) is too simplistic and overlooks the agency of PVOs. This is not to say that the PVS has 
inviolable agency and an unassailable ability to innovate. Neoliberal policies and the growing 
market in criminal justice have an important impact on the PVS, but these are neither omnipotent 
nor monolithic forces and commentators must analyse these developments critically.  
 
The PVS: Beyond Neoliberalism 
Political Economy 
 
Political economy provides a useful theoretical approach, which emphasises that the economic 
“must be seen as part of a complex set of interdependencies with individual, moral, cultural and 
other social dimensions” (Reiner, 2012: 302). Although economic factors undeniably form an 
important element of analysis, the broader and more nuanced theoretical approach provided by 
political economy stands in contrast to the “unadulterated emphasis” that neoliberal approaches 
place on the market as the source and arbiter of human freedoms (Mudge, 2008: 704). Although 
early work using political economy (such as that of Rusche and Kirchheimer) is acknowledged to 
be economically determinist, a sophisticated use of this approach can provide an analysis of how 
economic pressures operate alongside other non-economic forces to shape penal practice (Garland, 
1990: 110).  
 
 Theorising the PVS in this way enables the production of nuanced accounts that 
acknowledge the multilayered and diverse acquiescences, struggles and contestations that have 
resulted from and exist independently of neoliberal penal reforms (Hart, 2002: 813). More broadly, 
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political economy can provide “an account of interacting structures and processes, in which class 
relations are sustained (or transformed) by means of ideological and political struggles as well as by 
economic forces” (Garland, 1990: 111). The approach provided by political economy has many 
potential applications for studying the PVS. In this piece, it is used primarily to counter the 
tendency towards economic determinism and to stimulate an examination of the PVS that moves 
beyond the market-centric perspective by discussing the agency, innovation and heterogeneity 
found amongst PVOs. This preliminary application of political economy challenges the dominant 
argument that market reforms bring the risk that the PVS will become institutionalised and 
ultimately servant to government. Instead, the examples provided below indicate that contract 
funding is not a universal draw or necessity for PVOs. Some PVOs will not 'buy in' to neoliberal 
reforms because their organisational ideologies will not permit it, or they may participate in the 
market for criminal justice services on their own terms. The transformative potential of the PVS and 
its role in increasing the social capital of a vulnerable group is largely beyond the scope of this 
introductory article, but it is important to note that the campaigning and advocacy work of 
organisations that remain outside the market in criminal justice services will not be compromised as 
a result of financial dependence on government. 
 
A nuanced economic analysis 
 
First, a nuanced analysis of economic factors is provided. Although commentators have tended to 
present statutory funding as a unitary entity, in fact there are multiple sources of statutory funding. 
Charities obtain grant and contract funding from a variety of statutory agencies, within and outside 
criminal justice. The sources of statutory funding used by penal voluntary organisations include:  
HM Prison Service; The National Probation Service; Individual Probation Trusts; NOMS; The 
Ministry of Justice; The Department of Health; Primary Care Trusts; The Department for Education; 
14/31 
City and County Councils; The Homes and Communities Agency; Supporting People and even the 
European Commission.  
 
 Even amongst criminal justice funders, there are multiple agencies involved, e.g. The 
National Probation Service, individual Probation Trusts and NOMS. These sources do not exercise 
monolithic control and their money will come with varied restrictions (and freedoms). The priorities 
of funders are complex and a product of the structures and aim(s) of individual agencies. Although 
money from any funder will usually be accompanied with some exercise of influence on the 
recipient (Ellis Paine et al., 2012), it is important to problematise the impact of these influences. 
 
 Furthermore, it is important not to infer that the apparently “unpopular nature of work with 
offenders” (Mills et al., 2011: 207; Maguire, 2012: 491) precludes the possibility of charities  
fundraising from non-statutory or non-contractual sources, as this is not the case. In fact, a plurality 
of funding sources are used by PVOs to sustain their operations. Grants from charitable trusts and 
foundations, donations from individuals and other organisations, social enterprise and corporate 
support are also vital to the continuing existence of many PVOs. Grant-making trusts play a 
particularly important role, being “one of the most significant funders – if not the most significant 
funder – amongst charities working in the criminal justice system” (The Joseph Rank Trust, 2012: 
5).  
 
 Non-statutory sources of funding have a twofold importance: as primary sources of funding 
for over 40% of PVOs and as secondary sources of funding for PVOs that are mainly public-
funded. Using a dataset from the 2008 National Survey of Third Sector Organisations (NSTSO), 
Gojkovic et al. found that public monies comprised the primary source of funding for 56% to 59% 
of organisations who work with offenders (2011: 17). This dataset and associated analyses make an 
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important contribution to the evidence base on the third sector in the UK but potentially privilege 
the responses of organisations in receipt of public funding, as these organisations are likely to have 
a greater interest in returning completed surveys (Gojkovic et al., 2011: 17; Clifford et al., 2010). 
PVOs with a particular dependence on statutory sources of funding are amongst the largest in the 
sector and thus have the greatest levels of contact with prisoners and (ex-)offenders. Again, 
although public funding is evidently important, it is not the only source of funding available to or 
used by PVOs. Statutory grants may have reduced alongside the growth of commissioning and the 
availability of funds from other charitable bodies may have reduced as a result of the economic 
climate and the significant philanthropic investment made into the Women's Diversionary Fund, but 
alternative options remain and are used by charities. To provide a more theoretically complete 
account of the PVS, scholars should acknowledge and discuss this. 
 
 A large number of voluntary organisations are not dependent upon statutory funding, or even 
in receipt of it. The Howard League for Penal Reform is a notable example that has a multimillion 
pound income yet is on principle reliant on donations from individuals and trusts to carry out its 
work (Howard League, 2010). These PVOs do tend to be smaller than corporate-style organisations 
such as Nacro that figure heavily in the literature, but nevertheless should not be entirely 
overlooked. Furthermore, the spectrum of funding runs from organisations that are heavily 
dependent on statutory sources of funding to self-proclaimed independent organisations who do not 
receive any statutory funding, e.g. INQUEST, Prisoners' Advice Service (PAS, 2010: 2) and Unlock 
(Unlock, 2010: 2). At various points between these two extremes of the funding spectrum, there are 
three other key configurations. First, there are a group of organisations that receive no income from 
statutory sources without necessarily being ideologically opposed to it, e.g. AFFECT, Birth 
Companions (Birth Companions, 2010: 6) and Prisoners' Penfriends. Second, organisations that are 
mainly dependent on grants from trusts and charitable foundations might also earn some income 
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from statutory sources e.g. Action for Prisoner's Families (APF, 2010: 5), The Concord Prison Trust 
(Concord Prison Trust, 2010: 7, also 4) and Feltham Community Chaplaincy Trust (FCCT, 2010: 
11, also 8,14). Finally, some voluntary organisations earn a percentage of their funds from social 
enterprise, e.g. Fine Cell Work (FCW, 2010: 2) and The Prison Advice and Care Trust (The Prison 
Advice and Care Trust, 2010: 13). 
 
 Even organisations that deliver services under contract to statutory organisations often 
simultaneously run other programmes that are not funded through statutory sources. Alongside their 
MoJ contract to provide resettlement services at HM YOI Thorn Cross, New Bridge run a 
nationwide befriending service for prisoners that receives no Prison Service or statutory funding 
(New Bridge, 2010: 21). New Bridge deem their befriending service to have transformative 
potential, providing this example of a life-sentenced prisoner: “A letter, a visitor, a New Bridge 
befriender, changed this man's life completely. Somebody did care and that gave him hope and with 
hope came the willpower to better his life” (New Bridge, 2010: 3). Similarly, Contact Cheshire 
Support Group run the visitor centre at HMP Styal under contract to HM Prison Service, but 
simultaneously employ a Family Link Worker who works with the families of offenders and 
prisoners in the First Night Centre, funded by the Westminster Foundation (CCSG Annual Report, 
2010).  
 
 It is undeniable that statutory sources of funding are important for PVOs, that there is a 
market in criminal justice services or that many voluntary organisations face financial difficulties. 
However, the inference that competing for service delivery contracts and accepting the associated 
operating parameters is the only means of survival for PVOs is misleading. Sources of funding used 
by the PVS are in fact multiple and varied. 
PVO Heterogeneity 
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Commentators have acknowledged that the PVS is far from “homogeneous” (Mills et al., 2011: 
204), being composed of organisations that are “highly differentiated” (Corcoran, 2011: 40). But, 
the heterogeneity of organisations in the penal voluntary sector remains largely overlooked by 
commentators. The arguments about the financial necessities of participating in the market for penal 
services are powerful, but only directly relevant to certain voluntary organisations. Although the 
proportion of penal voluntary organisations that are in receipt of statutory funding is unknown, 
across the general voluntary sector “three quarters of charities receive no government funding” 
(Corcoran, 2011: 41, emphasis added). Nevertheless, commentary is focussed to emphasise the 
impact of the market in criminal justice services.  
 
 For example, Mills et al. (2011: 193) discuss the relationship that is developing between the 
penal voluntary sector and the state through neoliberalism and the process of commissioning. 
Corcoran (2011: 33) stresses that political reforms “are poised to contribute to the exponential 
growth of a penal voluntary sector”. But this selective focus obscures how participating in 
contracted-out service delivery will only ever be a priority concern or even a possibility for a certain 
type of voluntary organisation (Unwin and Molyneux, 2005: 37). Those without the organisational 
capacity, infrastructure and funds required to participate in commissioning processes, those without 
the need or desire to do so and those ideologically opposed to market reforms will be largely 
unaffected. As such, the government's “dramatically increased engagement with the sector” 
(Neilson, 2009: 408) could better be conceptualised as economic engagement with part of the PVS.  
 
 Smaller organisations seem notable only as a result of concerns about their “future viability” 
(Mills et al., 2011: 195) due to their inability to participate in the market of criminal justice: such 
providers are ostensibly “being crowded out by a 'Tesco-effect' in commissioning cycles, whereby 
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the economies of scale and national programmes provided by large players prove attractive to 
cautious statutory purchasers” (Corcoran, 2011: 41). But not entering this market (either by choice 
or necessity) does not render these organisations extinct. Operating with smaller numbers of service 
users does not mean that such organisations are worthy of scholarly oversight.   
 
Agency and Innovation:  Individual Dimensions 
 
The agency of PVOs ought not be overstated. But, the scholarly emphasis upon how governments 
have shaped the voluntary sector masks how the growth of the market in criminal justice services 
has actually elicited a variety of responses from voluntary organisations. The claim that PVOs are 
“rolling over” to pressures to compete for service delivery contracts “or going under” is misleading 
(Benson and Hedge, 2009: 35) and taking this line of argument means that the agency and 
innovation displayed by some organisations remains undiscussed.  
 
 In fact, attitudes to contracting vary widely across the sector. I now provide three examples 
of the attitudes to contracting expressed by three PVOs in their annual accounts. These examples 
come from PVOs with very different organisational structures and income levels and are intended to 
demonstrate the range of attitudes that exist in the sector. Nacro are “actively working with 
government to identify opportunities in our market sector where government has announced an 
intention to outsource services” and are responding to increases in performance related contracts by 
“adapting our operational structures to address the monitoring of performance” (Nacro, 2010: 6-10). 
Fine Cell Work (FCW) make no mention of contracting or intention to contract in their accounts, 
rather they are mitigating the risk of a funding drop through a business plan “that seeks to expand 
the charity's product sales” with the aim of building “a sustainable social business and charity with 
the prisoners as stakeholders in the enterprise”. In 2010, the year of the economic recession, FCW 
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saw an increase in voluntary income and product sales and their donations income (as opposed to 
income from grant-making trusts) rose by 70% (FCW, 2010: 2-9). Community Resettlement and 
Support Project deem attracting funding to be a “significant challenge” as they are a small, new, 
local charity working with an “unpopular” client group; have “insufficient resources and capacity to 
bid for or enter into partnerships for the delivery of contracts”; and their principal activity is 
befriending, which is often considered “an ambiguous activity by many funders who are concerned 
with targets and outcomes”. Nevertheless, the charity has secured funds from Volunteering England 
and is thus “in a good position to move forward and achieve its objectives” (CRSP, 2010: 13, 14, 
19). These examples indicate that the apparent necessity for PVOs to become proactively 
competitive in order to survive is not applicable across the sector.  
 
 Despite widespread struggles for funding amongst voluntary organisations, it is important 
for commentators not to overlook the capacity of PVOs to pursue sources of income that fit with 
their organisational priorities. Even organisations that have previously received high proportions of 
statutory funding may be able to minimise or remove this reliance. For example, Apex Charitable 
Trust experienced two extremely challenging years due to statutory funding agreements coming to 
an end alongside reduced stock market values and dividend income. In order to ensure its “ongoing 
viability”, all head office staff accepted a reduction in their paid hours of work, without which “the 
work of the Trust would have ceased”. The Trust also designed and adopted a new strategy of 
developing “services that are multi-funded, not dependent upon statutory contracting” (Apex, 2010: 
4-10).  
 
 Although public funding apparently exerts a “magnetic pull” (Corcoran, 2009: 32), this is 
not universally applicable to penal voluntary organisations. The strength of the magnetic pull has 
been overstated and some appreciation of how PVOs engage with statutory institutions other than 
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economically is also important. For example, Unlock (the National Association of Reformed 
Offenders) have a clear policy of “not seeking Government funding for service delivery”, instead 
sustaining their activities through fundraising from grants and trusts (Unlock, 2010: 14, 28). Unlock 
characterise participating in service delivery under contract as akin to becoming an “instrument of 
the state” (Bath, 2011: 16) and emphasise that “the rhetoric of partnership in service delivery should 
not be confused with a relationship of equal partners” (Bath, 2011: 15). For Unlock, the contract 
relationship between the statutory agencies and PVOs is “purchaser/provider, master/slave” (Bath, 
2011: 15). Unlock have a significant campaigning role and engage with statutory institutions on a 
non-economic basis. Unlock recently submitted their review of a draft leaflet for prisoners to the 
Parole Board, initiated a round table with the Home Office and made submissions to the review of 
the Criminal Records Regime (Unlock, 2010: 20).  
 
 It even remains possible to fundraise for advocacy work. Mills et al. (2011: 207) provide a 
relatively optimistic analysis of this area. They acknowledge the tension between voluntary 
organisations receiving government funding and maintaining organisational autonomy, but point out 
that “despite the lack of funding for such activities, service provision organisations have found time 
and space to engage in advocacy”. However, even this positive analysis overstates the threat to the 
campaigning roles of penal voluntary organisations. The Revolving Doors Agency work across 
England to change systems and improve services for people with multiple problems, including poor 
mental health, who are in contact with the CJS. They have recently established a new organisational 
model, giving a greater focus to influencing policy, and have obtained significant “new model 
funding” from grants and trusts to enable this work to be carried out alongside their service delivery 
activities (The Revolving Doors Agency, 2010: 11, also p. 7). To overlook counterexamples such as 
this has political impacts. 
The Political Impacts of Reductionism 
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Corcoran (2011: 48) claims that the 'business' case for marketising criminal justice services 
commodifies voluntary expertise and “does the voluntary sector a disservice at many levels”. But,  
by mirroring the official conception of the PVS, commentators have also done the sector a 
disservice. This recent commentary has provided a highly significant contribution to the literature, 
defining the terrain of this topic and laying the foundations for further analysis. However, the focus 
on the market for criminal justice services has so far come at the expense of recognition and 
analysis of the agency and innovation that exists amongst certain voluntary organisations. Although 
the existence of these qualities must not be overstated, ignoring them provides an impoverished 
account of the PVS and works to denigrate those qualities. This article has made a preliminary 
exploration of a more nuanced and politically enabling model, using political economy as an 
analytical framework. This framework has been used to provide an introductory awareness of thus 
far underacknowledged dimensions of the PVS which extend beyond neoliberalism and beyond the 
economic. The discussion highlighted how the agency, innovation and heterogeneity found amongst 
PVOs can be used to pursue and sustain their organisational ideologies, which may not enable 
participation in the market in criminal justice services and may stand in opposition to neoliberal 
reforms. The key argument of this article is that there is an independence and autonomy within the 
PVS that has so far been unexplored. PVOs are not necessarily biddable agents of policy and 
although beyond the scope of this article, they can exercise their potential to influence policy.  
 
 The tendency to present neoliberal penal reforms as inexorable and to produce “grimly 
pessimistic” accounts of the 'criminal justice state' risks reinforcing the very situation that 
commentators purport to expose (Hart, 2002: 817; Zedner, 2002: 342). Determinedly pessimistic 
scholarship creates its own set of problems, as emphasising dystopic visions of crime control leads 
scholars to overlook trends that point in a different direction (Zedner, 2002: 342, 355). Highlighting 
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the vulnerability of the penal voluntary sector to neoliberal policy reforms therefore risks 
embedding and fortifying said vulnerability. Identifying the “dangers and harms implicit in the 
contemporary scheme of things” is undeniably a crucial task for commentators (Garland, 2001: 3). 
However, there is a simultaneous responsibility to consider the political impact and 
representativeness of the accounts produced. Maguire points out that “there is no certainty that the 
fears of pessimists will materialise. Whether they do or not depends to a considerable extent on the 
attitudes, actions and decisions of individuals across the system” (2012: 491). Yet this is one of very 
few acknowledgements of such contingencies in recent commentary. Again, this exploration of the 
PVS based on the principles of political economy acknowledges the potential for outcomes other 
than the co-option of the PVS to emerge.  
 
  Neoliberalism is important. The developing market in criminal justice services and the 
involvement of charities in this market must be discussed. As acknowledged previously, the PVS is 
not 'beyond' the effects of neoliberalism. However, uncritical acceptance of neoliberalism and 
associated penal expansionism as monolithic and inexorable forces is damaging and is likely to 
create a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is therefore important that theory can describe and envision 
alternative possibilities and countermovements to neoliberal penal reforms and penal expansionism. 
As such, theory and commentary must progress beyond the centrality of neoliberalism. This article 
has made a contribution to this task by offering a new approach to the PVS informed by political 
economy. Moving beyond the narrow view of PVOs as biddable instruments of neoliberal policy, 
this approach can account for PVOs who are ideologically opposed to neoliberal policy reforms. 
Without ignoring the impacts of neoliberalism upon the PVS, this approach can also include those 
who are outside the realm of economic engagement with the PVS and those who exercise their 
agency to pursue new organisational models and funding streams. The approach offered here is not 
presented as a complete or conclusive theory, but is intended as a step in the right direction and a 
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springboard for further work. 
 
 Rather than suggesting endlessly open possibilities and alternatives to neoliberal reform 
(Hart, 2002: 819), this article is a call for theory and analysis that can account for the diversity of 
responses elicited by neoliberal reforms and avoids economic determinism. Cultivating such theory 
and analysis rather than merely assuming and embedding the dominance of neoliberalism and 
continued penal expansionism not only provides more complete accounts, but will help to check the 
criminological propensity towards dystopia. 
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